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INTRODUCTION
What is wrong about law without a lawmaker? One response, and
I think a fair one, is that the main difficulty of law without a
lawmaker is that it does not exist. But my purpose in this Article is
not to argue for that view.1 I will assume, as our domestic legal
system generally does, that a law is something that has legal effect,
and it has that effect because it was created or adopted by an entity
with the power to create rights or impose obligations.2 “Law” that
does not have the backing of some sovereign is not law, at least not
domestically.3 The questions I want to pursue are the following: If
we accept this view, which we can loosely term positivist, what prob-
lem would law without a lawmaker pose? Would the Constitution
restrain courts or other government actors from purporting to
enforce such “law”? 
The question might seem a surprising one to ask. Why should the
Constitution protect us from something that does not exist? If it
shields us from law without a lawmaker, why not Santa Claus and
zombies as well?4 But it turns out that this actually is an issue that
1. I think it is relatively commonsensical and relatively widely shared, and in any case,
our legal system has taken it as a premise since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
79 (1938) (“[B]ut law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without
some definite authority behind it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a more recent
academic statement of the view, see Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General
Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523, 524 (2004).
2. Sovereigns can of course adopt laws that they do not make. A state can receive the
general common law; it can adopt the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws or the Code of
Hammurabi; it could even prescribe that its contract law consisted of “the principles of equity
and justice.” But in all of these cases, it is the state’s act that gives these things legal force.
The state may not make them, but it makes them laws. Whether the state’s high court should
then be authoritative in its exposition of these things is a separate question, though I believe
the Constitution gives it the ability to claim authoritative status and may well prevent a
disclaimer. And how exactly pre-Erie state courts understood the operation of the general
common law is still another question. See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1127-35 (2011) (discussing these issues).
3. I add this qualification because international law and admiralty do seem to function
quite like law without a lawmaker. See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Common
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 512 (2006) (discussing international law); Ernest A. Young,
Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 274 (1999) (describing admiralty as “a form
of general common law”).
4. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not protect us from Santa
Claus, at least not on Establishment Clause grounds. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
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the Constitution addresses and about which it gives a relatively
clear answer. If there is no law without a lawmaker—if, as Holmes
said, “law in the sense of which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it”—then its purported
enforcement is coercion without law.5 It is the government using its
power to compel an individual to do something—to take an action,
or refrain from acting, or possibly to pay money if he is the target of
a suit for damages—in the absence of any legal warrant for the
compulsion. That amounts to a deprivation of liberty or property
without law. With no law, there cannot be due process of law, so
what we have is a relatively clear violation of the Due Process
Clause.6 The issue is not a lack of procedure, so the violation is of
what we now tend to call substantive due process. Thus, the sub-
stantive aspect of the Due Process Clause protects us from govern-
ment coercion that is not backed by a valid law. I will call this a
“valid rule” due process argument.7
687 (1984) (permitting inclusion of creche in Christmas display). Zombies do not appear in the
Supreme Court’s opinions, with the possible exception of Justice Scalia’s memorable
characterization of the Lemon test as “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie.” Lamb’s
Chapel v. Moriches, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
5. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. The principle that coercive action must be backed by a valid rule has been recognized
in the literature, notably in Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3. The
Supreme Court has also articulated it and drawn the connection to the Due Process Clause.
See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786-87 (2011) (“The Due
Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only
by the exercise of lawful power.... This is no less true with respect to [judicial jurisdiction]
than with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its
sphere.”); Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) (“Certainly one of the basic
purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to protect a person against having the
Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land.”).
There remains, of course, the question of what will make a rule invalid, which I explore in the
body of this Article. I note here, however, that I do not mean to adopt the position that a rule
that is invalid in any application is invalid in the relevant sense. For a more extensive
discussion, see Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998). I ask instead whether there is a rule that is
valid to the extent that it governs the individual’s action.
7. For discussions of the “valid rule requirement,” see, for example, Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321,
1332-33 (2000); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 386-87 (1999). 
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This model of substantive due process as restraining government
action unauthorized by law might seem odd. It is not the modern
doctrinal formulation, which tends to work instead in terms of
fundamental rights that trump otherwise valid laws.8 But my aim
in this Article is to show that this form of argument is much more
common than supposed. The due process prohibition of compulsion
without law is the invisible thread that connects doctrinal areas
often thought of as quite distinct: Erie, Lochner-era substantive due
process, overbreadth, and modern federalism decisions such as
United States v. Morrison,9 United States v. Lopez,10 and Bond v.
United States.11 In what follows, I will explain how those different
doctrinal areas conform to this model, and what their connection
means. 
I. ALLGEYER AND LOCHNER
Nowadays, it is conventional to call cases such as Allgeyer v.
Louisiana12 and Lochner v. New York13 substantive due process de-
cisions.14 So claiming that they should be understood as the product
of a principle I have identified as substantive due process is neither
novel nor controversial. What is slightly more controversial is my
description of that principle as a restraint on government action
unauthorized by law. Modern substantive due process cases are
concerned with the question of whether the interest asserted by an
8. To determine whether an asserted right is fundamental, the Court asks either
whether it is deeply rooted in our traditions and practices, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997), or whether it is fundamental to personhood, see Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1992) (plurality opinion), with no explanation of why
one inquiry rather than the other is chosen.
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
12. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. It was not so at the time they were decided: the distinction between substantive and
procedural due process did not exist before the New Deal, and the phrase “substantive due
process” did not appear in a Supreme Court opinion until 1948. See James W. Ely, The
Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 (1999) (citing Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62,
90 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
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individual qualifies as a fundamental right.15 If it does, it is typically
protected by the demanding strict scrutiny test: it can be abridged
only if such abridgment is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest.16 If the necessity or the compelling interest is lacking, an
otherwise valid law—one concededly within the power of gov-
ernment to enact—will be trumped by the fundamental right.17
Fundamental rights, we could say, carve islands of individual lib-
erty out of the stream of government power.
At least, that is the modern analysis of substantive due process.
The principle I have identified is rather different. It is not concerned
with identifying islands of liberty or fundamental rights that trump
otherwise valid laws. The importance of the individual’s interest is
largely irrelevant. Instead, the approach I have described seeks to
find and enforce limits on government power—the banks of the
stream. Government power is delegated by the people; it is limited;
and if those limits are exceeded, the purported law is simply void.
It is no law at all, and no attempt to enforce it can be dignified with
the name “due process of law.” This model of substantive due pro-
cess has a long history in American jurisprudence—longer, in fact,
than the fundamental rights version. It can be traced back to
Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, where Chase noted that 
[t]he purposes for which men enter into society will determine
the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the
foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the
proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will
limit the exercise of it.... There are acts which the Federal, or
State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority....
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.18
15. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-22 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 932 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“To
overcome the burden of strict scrutiny, the interests must be compelling.”).
17. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003).
18. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). For recent recognitions of this variant of substantive
due process, see, for example, Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 177 (2011) (describing theory
whereby “the process by which a law is applied to individuals includes a judicial assessment
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Which of these versions of substantive due process is at work in
Lochner-era cases? The question is disputed in the literature, but I
believe an examination of Allgeyer and Lochner will suggest the
latter. 
A. Allgeyer
In 1894, the Louisiana legislature passed a law that imposed a
thousand-dollar fine on anyone who issued or obtained marine
insurance from a company that had not complied with all elements
of Louisiana’s insurance regulation.19 The statute specified its scope:
it reached anyone who issued an insurance certificate “in this State”
or took any other act in-state to effect insurance “on property, then
in this State.”20 E. Allgeyer & Co., a company exporting cotton from
New Orleans to Europe, bought insurance for a cotton shipment
from the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, a New York corpora-
tion.21 The contract was executed in New York, but the cotton was
in New Orleans at the time of the transaction. Allgeyer sent a
description of it from New Orleans to New York.22
Louisiana deemed the transmission of the description an “act in
this State to effect ... insurance on property, then in this State,” in
the words of the statute and accordingly sought to impose the
of whether the substance of a statute was within the jurisdiction or power of the legislature
to enact”); Louise Weinberg, An Almost Archaeological Dig: Finding a Surprisingly Rich Early
Understanding of Substantive Due Process, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 165-67 (2010)
(distinguishing the two versions); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 423-27 (2010) (describing different versions).
19. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 579 (1897). The statutory language read as
follows: 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, That any person,
firm or corporation who shall fill up, sign or issue in this State any certificate of
insurance under an open marine policy, or who in any manner whatever does
any act in this State to effect, for himself or for another, insurance on property,
then in this State, in any marine insurance company which has not complied in
all respects with the laws of this State, shall be subject to a fine of one thousand
dollars for each offense, which shall be sued for in any competent court by the
attorney general for the use and benefit of the charity hospitals in New Orleans
and Shreveport.
Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 580-81.
22. Id. at 580-82.
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thousand-dollar fine on Allgeyer.23 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, all the Justices agreed that the Constitution barred
liability.24 But why?
There is certainly language in Allgeyer that seems to suggest
something like the modern conception of rights as trumps.25
Fourteenth Amendment liberty, the Court announced,
means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in
the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his liveli-
hood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a success-
ful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.26
But these are not rights that necessarily trump an otherwise
valid state law. As the Court put it, “We do not intend to hold that
in no such case can the State exercise its police power. When and
how far such power may be legitimately exercised with regard to
these subjects must be left for determination to each case as it
arises.”27 These liberties may be restrained, as the words of the
Constitution make clear, by due process of law. 
The key issue in Allgeyer is why the Louisiana regulation did not
constitute due process of law. What was wrong with Louisiana’s
23. Id. at 579.
24. Id. at 592-93.
25. For examples of scholarship reading Allgeyer this way, see, for example, Frederick
Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47,
56 n.28 (describing Allgeyer as recognizing “unenumerated fundamental rights that are
insulated from state police power regulation”); Stephen A. Plass, Mandatory Arbitration as
an Employer’s Contractual Prerogative: The Efficiency Challenge to Equal Employment
Opportunity, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 195, 210 (2011) (stating that Allgeyer “is credited with
formally holding that liberty of contract is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). For a counterexample, see David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 324, 376-77 (1985) (“It is clear enough that what moved the Court was what it
perceived as the extraterritorial application of state law and not the substance of the law in
general.”).
26. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
27. Id. at 590.
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attempt to demand compliance with its marine insurance regula-
tions? The answer is not that liberty of contract is a fundamental
right that cannot be restrained in the name of state regulation of
the insurance industry.28 It is quite clear from the Court’s opinion
that New York could have enacted and enforced an identical
statute—it could have set requirements for the issuance of marine
insurance and fined either party to the contract if Atlantic Mutual
did not meet those requirements.29 It is equally clear that Louisiana
could enforce its statute against people who formed contracts in
Louisiana or contracted with companies that did business there.30
The law was not invalid in toto, but it could not be enforced against
Allgeyer. The problem, the Court said, was that Louisiana’s demand
was made with respect to “a valid contract made outside the State
and with reference to a company which [was] not doing business
within its limits.”31 Louisiana exceeded the limits of its power
because those limits coincided with the borders of the state.
Allegeyer relied, then, on the principle that state legislative juris-
diction was territorially bounded.32 Louisiana lacked the power to
regulate a contract formed and performed outside the state, and a
statute purporting to do so was no law but, in Chase’s words, a mere
“act.”33 We no longer have this conception of territorial limits on
state legislative jurisdiction, of course,34 but that is not the impor-
tant point. What is important is that Allgeyer is not about a fun-
damental right to contract that trumps state law. It is about the
limits of state lawmaking power; it is about the banks of the stream,
not the islands. 
Allgeyer is a particularly clear example of the reliance on the
limits of government power because the limits were actual physical
boundaries: state power, the Court said, could not be projected
28. See James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. REV.
1509, 1511-12 (2008).
29. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 583-84, 592-93.
30. The Court noted that in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), it had upheld a
similar law as applied to contracts within the state, and it did not question Hooper. See
Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 586-88.
31. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 593.
32. See Currie, supra note 25, at 376-77.
33. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
34. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (enunciating relaxed
limits on legislative jurisdiction).
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beyond state lines. But there were other, invisible lines that limited
state power as well.
B. Lochner
Joseph Lochner owned a bakeshop in Utica, New York. He hired
an employee to work more than sixty hours a week, in violation of
a New York law setting maximum hours for bakers.35 Lochner was
convicted of the offense and fined fifty dollars, but when his case
reached the Supreme Court, the Court held (as in Allgeyer, but this
time not unanimously) that the state law was unconstitutional.36
What was the problem with the law? As in Allgeyer, the problem
was that the state had exceeded its authority. As the Court put it,
“The limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this
case.”37 Understanding what that limit was requires us to look more
closely at the concept of the police power.
Nowadays, “police power” is often used to indicate a general legis-
lative power—a power that has no limits and whose exercise may be
defeated only by the assertion of a trump-like right.38 But in the
Lochner era, it was understood differently. Much as the federal
government is now understood to have limited powers to address
particular issues, the state police power was understood to autho-
rize legislation directed to particular purposes. In Lochner’s formu-
lation, the state could legislate to promote “the safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the public.”39
The problem with New York’s maximum hours law was not that
it collided with a fundamental right to contract. The Court conceded
that working hours could be limited by any valid exercise of the
35. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46-47 (1905).
36. Id. at 64.
37. Id. at 58.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (warning that accepting
federal authority to regulate mere possession of firearms would “bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States”); Stephen L. Carter, Originalism and the Bill of Rights, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 141, 146 (1992) (describing “general police power” as a government’s power “to
do anything it pleases so long as it does not trample on rights”).
39. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. In theory, state authority is still limited—it is limited to the
police power—but the police power is now understood to be a general power: an ocean, rather
than streams.
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police power.40 In earlier cases, it had upheld a maximum hours law
for miners as a means to protect their safety41 and a Sunday closing
law as conducive to “the general welfare.”42 The problem was that
none of the police power justifications—safety, health, morals, or
general welfare—were available. A substantial part of the majority
opinion, and also of Justice Harlan’s dissent, was devoted to dis-
cussing whether a health or safety rationale was persuasive.
Ultimately, the majority decided it was not.43 Nor could the law be
explained as an attempt to make all members of the public better
off.44 Instead, the Court believed that the New York law was an
example of partial legislation—a law that favored one group
(employees) at the expense of another (employers).45 This type of law
was akin to the government “tak[ing] ... from A and giv[ing] ... to B,”
which Justice Chase had offered as an example of legislative action
that would not constitute a law.46
Just as in Allgeyer, then, the Lochner Court was using the Due
Process Clause to protect individuals against government acts that
were invalid because they exceeded government authority. The pur-
ported laws were invalid on their own terms, not because the Due
Process Clause rendered them so.47 What barred their enforcement
40. Id. at 54.
41. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (upholding maximum hours law for
miners).
42. See Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 305 (1896) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58, 64. There is also a brief discussion of whether the regulation
could be sustained “as a labor law, pure and simple.” Id. at 57. Restrictions on contracting
power were considered permissible when one of the parties lacked full capacity, for example
by reason of minority or mental defect. But the Court quickly concluded that bakers did not
fall into that category. See id.
44. See id. at 64.
45. See id.
46. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). For elaboration of this point, see, for
example, Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881,
998-1000 (2005); John V. Orth, Taking from A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process and
the Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 339-40 (1997).
47. If these laws were invalid on their own terms, one might ask, why does the Due
Process Clause matter at all? Why does the Court go to the trouble of deciding that the
individuals are asserting a protected liberty interest, if not to decide that this liberty can be
used as a trump over state law? The answer is that if the Due Process Clause did not protect
them, Lochner and Allgeyer might still have won their cases—if the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the limits of the police power was correct—but they would not have had federal claims.
Limits on the police power come from general constitutional law—principles common to all
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was not an island of preferred liberty but the boundaries of
government power. 
Of course, we no longer hold the same views about limits on state
police power as the Lochner Court.48 But that does not mean that
this model of constitutional analysis has vanished from our juris-
prudence. To the contrary, although more recent cases may not
invoke the Due Process Clause explicitly, they too rely on the prin-
ciple that the clause bars enforcement of laws that exceed lawmak-
ing power. In the next Part, I argue that Erie belongs to this model
too.
II. ERIE
The story of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is well known, but a
brief rehearsal will serve to foreground the elements that are impor-
tant for my purposes. Erie arose out of an accident in Pennsylvania,
when an Erie Railroad train struck a pedestrian, Harry Tompkins.49
A key issue in the case was whether the railroad owed a duty of care
to someone, like Tompkins, walking parallel to the tracks on rail-
road property.
The law that governed this issue, under the pre-Erie framework,
was the general common law. The general common law was law
without a lawmaker; it was a set of rules that judges found, rather
than made. As Brandeis put it, quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, it
was “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”50
free governments—but state violations of these limits were not understood to create federal
claims until after the enactment of the Due Process Clause. See Michael G. Collins, Before
Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 1263, 1304-05 (2000). There is some irony in the fact that this general constitutional
law, used to prevent state coercion without law, was itself akin to law without a lawmaker—it
was not textually enacted by the states. But courts attributed it, if somewhat loosely, to the
sovereign people, so it did have a positivist pedigree.
48. More precisely, we do retain the view that the state police power extends only to acts
that are in the public interest. But we also now believe that courts should be extremely
deferential to the legislature’s view of what fits that criterion: “When the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.” Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1938).
50. Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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Because the general common law was not made by any sovereign,
no courts were authoritative in its interpretation.51 Thus while there
was in theory a single law—the general common law—that deter-
mined whether the railroad owed Tompkins a duty of care, in
practice, federal courts and the courts of different states might
adopt different interpretations, with no single authority to impose
uniformity. In fact, the courts of Pennsylvania had apparently
adopted a minority position, ruling that in such cases railroads had
only a duty “to refrain from willful or wanton injury.”52 Seeking to
avoid this interpretation, Tompkins sued in federal court in New
York, and the Second Circuit obligingly announced that “upon
questions of general law the federal courts are free, in absence of a
local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the
law is.”53 Noting that the “great weight of authority” rejected the
Pennsylvania position, the Second Circuit did too: it held that the
railroad owed Tompkins a duty of care and could be found negligent
if he was struck by an object protruding from the train.54
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court said that the Second
Circuit’s approach, which was the approach of Swift v. Tyson,55 was
based on a mistaken reading of the Rules of Decision Act.56 More
than that, it was unconstitutional.57 But why?
Locating Erie’s constitutional source has long been considered a
task of some difficulty.58 On the account developed in this Article,
however, the reasoning is quite straightforward, and it is identical
to that deployed in Lochner and Allgeyer. Law, Brandeis announced,
does not exist without a lawmaker:
51. See 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.12 (1935); Kermit
Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1838-39 (2005) (discussing nature of general common law).
52. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
56. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938).
57. Id. at 77-78.
58. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1289
(2007) (noting that Erie’s constitutional source “has remained elusive for almost seventy
years”); Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 602-14 (2008) (rejecting
several constitutional rationales). 
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[B]ut law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does
not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common
law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common
law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that
State existing by the authority of that State without regard to
what it may have been in England or anywhere else....
[T]he authority and only authority is the State, and if that be
so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its
Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.59
The rule of law the Second Circuit was applying—that the
railroad owed Tompkins a duty of care—was not created by
Pennsylvania, because its courts followed a different rule.60 But it
was not the law of any other state either; given the territorialist
understanding then dominant in choice of law, no other state’s law
could determine rights related to an accident in Pennsylvania.61 Nor
was the law federal. Congress did, of course, have power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate railroads,62 and it could have imposed
a federal rule by statute. But it had not. Federal courts probably
lacked the power to do so on their own initiative, and in any case,
the Second Circuit did not purport to be making federal law.63 So the
Second Circuit’s rule was law without a lawmaker, which is to say
no law at all. Applying it to impose liability on the railroad was the
deprivation of property without law and, a fortiori, without due
process of law.64 Erie’s constitutional source—the constitutional
59. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
60. Id. at 70. Might Pennsylvania courts have decided that Pennsylvania’s law would be
the general common law, while also deciding that their views as to the content of that law
should not be authoritative? This would give the general common law a positivist pedigree
while allowing for independent interpretation in federal courts and the courts of other states.
The suggestion has been made. See Green, supra note 2, at 1121-35. But it is hard for me to
see why a state would adopt that position, as there seem to be obvious reasons why it would
be desirable for other courts to follow its interpretation of its own law, and no Justice in Erie
appeared to think that this was what was going on. See Roosevelt, supra note 51, at 1840-41.
Contemporaneous accounts of the general common law also sound nonpositivist. See generally
id. at 1838-40 (discussing Joseph Beale’s view of the general common law). 
61. See generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS 6,
113-14 (2010) (discussing territorialist understanding).
62. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
63. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
64. It is worth noting that the application of this fictitious law to uphold liability in court
amounted to a deprivation of property sufficient to trigger due process protection. It was not
1000 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:987
provision that would be violated by continued adherence to the pre-
Erie practice—is the Due Process Clause.65
Erie, of course, featured a situation in which there was no federal
statute even purporting to determine the parties’ substantive
rights.66 The only way in which a federal rule might have been
imposed was through judicial common lawmaking, but the federal
courts had not purported to do so either. What happens, however,
if the federal government does seek to exercise its authority, but
fails? What if Congress adopts an act that goes beyond its power?
That is the topic of the next Part.
III. LOPEZ AND MORRISON
It is now an axiom of our constitutional jurisprudence that federal
lawmaking power is enumerated and limited.67 A law that reaches
beyond congressional power is no law at all; it is simply void. So
what happens when the federal government seeks to enforce such
a law against an individual?
Two cases from the end of the twentieth century presented this
question. In 1992, Alfonso Lopez was arrested on the grounds of
Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a .38 caliber
handgun.68 The federal government prosecuted him under the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which prohibited the pos-
session of firearms within statutorily defined school zones.69
In 1994, Antonio Morrison, a student at Virginia Tech, allegedly
raped Christy Brzonkala, a fellow student.70 She sought to hold him
liable under the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
which created a federal civil rights cause of action for the victims of
gender-motivated violence.71
necessary to inquire whether the railroad had a liberty interest in the out-of-court activity
that was being restrained, injuring trespassers. Lochner and Allgeyer both likewise faced
obvious in-court deprivations, imprisonment and a fine, which means that the discussion in
those cases of whether contract is a Fourteenth Amendment liberty was actually unnecessary.
65. See Weinberg, supra note 1, at 524. 
66. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938).
67. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
68. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
69. Id.
70. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
71. Id. at 604.
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In each case, the Supreme Court struck down the federal law, on
essentially the same grounds. The activities in each case were con-
ducted purely intrastate, and neither mere possession nor violent
crime were “economic” in nature.72 Consequently, Congress could
not reach them using its power to regulate interstate commerce.73
So the laws were invalid. But what constitutional provision
stopped the federal government from imprisoning Lopez or demand-
ing that Morrison pay compensation to Brzonkala? In a recent
decision, the Court described a similar argument as the claim that
the federal law “would violate the Commerce Clause.”74 The court of
appeals in Lopez and Lopez’s lawyers at that level both suggested
that congressional legislation that went beyond Congress’s enumer-
ated powers would “violate[ ] the Tenth Amendment.”75
Neither of these contentions is particularly plausible. Congress
can hardly be said to violate the Commerce Clause by enacting a
law not supported by the commerce power; the clause is a grant of
power, not a restriction. Certainly, we would not say that a law
sustainable on some other ground, such as Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, violates the Commerce Clause because it
cannot also be based on the Commerce Clause. Nor does the Tenth
Amendment, if read in the most straightforward way, place limits
on Congress. It does not forbid Congress from doing anything; what
it does is affirm the existence of state powers in much the same way
that the Ninth Amendment affirms the existence of individual
rights.76 And even if we read the Tenth Amendment to imply the
72. Id. at 602, 610-11 (noting and endorsing the economic/noneconomic distinction from
Lopez); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 567-68.
73. Because Congress also sought to rely on its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment as a basis for VAWA, the Morrison Court considered and rejected that power as
well. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27.
74. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 4 (2005). The Court may not have intended to endorse
this characterization, because it attributed the characterization to the respondents, who
offered that framing in their brief. See Brief for Respondents at 7, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-
1454), 2004 WL 2308766, at *7 (asserting that application of the Controlled Substances Act
“would violate the Commerce Clause”).
75. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting Lopez’s argument
that GFSZA violates the Tenth Amendment); id. at 1366 (suggesting that ultra vires federal
law violates the Tenth Amendment). Lopez’s lawyers at the Supreme Court level did not
mention the Tenth Amendment in their brief. See Brief for Respondent at vii, Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (No. 93-1260), 1994 WL 396915, at *4 (listing constitutional provisions involved, omitting
the Tenth Amendment).
76. The Tenth Amendment confirms that although the states surrendered some powers
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existence of states’ rights that trump federal law, as some cases
have, neither Lopez nor Morrison identified any such specially
protected area of state authority.77 Instead, as with Erie and
Lochner-era cases, the constitutional provision that bars coercive
action by the federal government in Lopez and Morrison is the Due
Process Clause.78 The federalist argument in such cases is best
understood as a valid rule due process claim.
Because the issue in these cases was simply the scope of federal
power, neither defendant relied on a law-trumping individual right.
Lopez might imaginably have made a Second Amendment argu-
ment, but he did not; Morrison obviously could not claim any spe-
cially protected interest in rape.79 Individual rights of that sort do
not matter if the claim is that the purported law is void because it
exceeds the enacting sovereign’s powers. But law-trumping rights
may be relevant in another way. A law is void if it goes beyond
legislative power, but it is also void, at least in part, if it collides
with a law-trumping right. If the right belongs to the individual in
court, then the analysis is straightforward: the individual asserts
the right and can resist enforcement of the law on that ground. But
what happens if the right at issue belongs not to the individual in
to the national government, like the power to conduct foreign affairs, and accepted some
constitutional limits on their powers, like the ban on bills of attainder, remaining powers were
not annihilated by the adoption of the Constitution. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124 (1941) (describing the amendment as “stat[ing] but a truism”). The Ninth Amendment
likewise works as an argument against an implied deprivation of rights: the Constitution’s
enumeration of certain rights should not be taken as a decision to annihilate those not
enumerated. See Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 498, 501 (2011).
77. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
78. In assigning this role to the Due Process Clause, I do not mean to suggest that in its
absence Lopez would have gone to jail. Judges would presumably have found some
principle—something like the general constitutional law at work in Lochner—to prevent the
government from imprisoning him without a valid law. But to say that some Bill of Rights
provisions in part restate fundamental principles of government that courts might enforce
even without textual support is neither uncommon nor particularly controversial. See, e.g.,
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 147-56 (1998)
(describing the declaratory theory of the Bill of Rights). Note, however, that Lochner’s case
would have come out differently because in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, he would have had no federal question.
79. As noted in the discussion of Erie, supra note 64, the in-court deprivations the
defendants faced were sufficient to trigger due process protections, even though at least
Morrison would have had a hard time arguing that his out-of-court behavior was liberty
protected under the Due Process Clause.
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court, but to someone else? Can the valid rule due process argument
ever be made in that situation? The next Part discusses this issue.
IV. OVERBREADTH, THIRD-PARTY STANDING, AND BOND
A. Overbreadth and Third-Party Standing 
The question of when one person can assert another’s rights is
generally considered under the rubric of third-party standing.80 In
that framework, the answer is typically that individuals must assert
their own rights. They cannot resist enforcement of a law against
them on the grounds that it might, in some other application, in-
fringe on someone else’s rights.81 The Supreme Court has indicated
that this rule is prudential, however, and in some cases it may be
relaxed.82 If an individual has some kind of relationship with the
third party whose rights she seeks to raise, and if the third party
faces some obstacle to asserting his own rights, the Court may allow
third-party standing.83
Things look different when the First Amendment enters the
picture. In the First Amendment context, individuals are frequently
allowed to argue that, although the government could validly regu-
late their behavior, the law by which it seeks to do so also trenches
on protected activity.84 Although this argument also relies on the
rights of individuals not present before the court, it is typically not
described as third-party standing. Instead it is called overbreadth.
80. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859
(1991).
81. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (stating that a party “generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties”); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (“[O]ne
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.”); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co.
v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219 (1912) (noting the argument that a statute was void
in other applications “and, if so void, [was] void in toto”; responding that “this court must deal
with the case in hand, and not with imaginary ones”).
82. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976).
83. Id. at 117-18.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010).
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In the First Amendment context, the rule that a substantially
overbroad law is invalid is well established.85
Overbreadth doctrine is notoriously puzzling, and I cannot list
every oddity here, much less make sense of them all.86 I will focus
on two. The first puzzle relates to third-party standing. Discussions
of third-party standing seem to assume that while third-party
standing may be granted in some cases and withheld in others, all
such cases are alike at the merits stage.87 If third-party standing is
granted, the individual before the court will fare at least as well as
would the absent third party whose rights he seeks to invoke. In
other words, if individual A, whose activity can be regulated,88 is
allowed to invoke the rights of individual B, whose activity is
protected, then individual A will win. 
By way of example, consider the jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause before Employment Division v. Smith.89
Under the rule of Sherbert v. Verner, religious activity occupied a
preferred position: it was entitled, at least in some cases, to an
exemption from generally applicable laws.90 Suppose that a statute
forbade the use of peyote and that, under established law, Native
85. See, e.g., id. (discussing overbreadth).
86. Overbreadth has attracted the attention of some very able scholars. In addition to
Fallon, supra note 80, excellent articles include Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State
and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 261-79 (1994), and Isserles, supra note 7.
87. See, e.g., Wulff, 428 U.S. at 113-16; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-14
(1973).
88. One point frequently made in the literature on overbreadth is that it is misleading or
oversimplified to speak of activity as protected or unprotected, because constitutional rights
actually do not carve out protected spheres of activity but rather protect only against certain
kinds of rules. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 6; David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative
Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 77-81 (2006). This sounds like a
sophisticated point, but I think it is actually analytically unhelpful. That is, I think that the
model of protected versus unprotected activity is a useful way of conceptualizing many
constitutional rights. The fact that, for instance, the government may arrest me for burning
someone else’s flag does not necessarily show that there is no such thing as a protected
activity of speech. It could also be taken as showing that speech may be restrained if it
combines with unprotected conduct, or that some restraints on speech are sufficiently
important and leave open sufficient alternative channels, such as allowing me to burn my own
flag, that they are permissible. Thus, in this Article I will continue to speak of protected and
unprotected activity.
89. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). Sherbert held that laws that substantially burdened religious
exercise must meet strict scrutiny. Id. at 402-03. This strict scrutiny was, however, not as
demanding in practice as one might have expected. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
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Americans would be entitled to an exemption for the use of peyote
in religious rituals. Could it possibly be the case that if some other
individual, say a bored college student, is allowed to invoke the
rights of Native Americans, he would prevail just as they would?
Could it possibly be the case that only a prudential rule stands in
the way of that outcome?
So the first puzzle is about whether, or when, the unprotected
party should fare as well as the protected one in third-party
standing cases. The second puzzle is about their relative fates in the
context of First Amendment overbreadth challenges. Here, the
situation is even stranger: the unprotected party actually does
better than the protected one. When the protected party would pre-
sumably win invalidation of the statute as it applies to his protected
conduct,91 the unprotected party receives a total, facial inval-
idation.92 Suppose, for instance, that a city has a statute prohibiting
all live entertainment. A theater owner wishing to put on a
Shakespeare play can challenge the statute on First Amendment
grounds and will prevail: the city cannot prohibit the performance
of plays. The owner of a nude dancing club could challenge the
statute too, but not on the grounds that the city cannot prohibit
nude dance.93 Instead, he would argue that the statute is unconsti-
tutional in many other applications, such as its application to
dramatic plays. He too would prevail, but the outcome would be a
total invalidation of the statute on overbreadth grounds.
How can we resolve these two puzzles? The key to understanding
them, I will suggest, is the form of due process argument I have
been discussing. The crucial question is when a third party’s rights
may work to invalidate a law in its application to the individual
before the court. When they do, the individual resisting enforcement
91. This raises the question of whether protected parties should be allowed to make
overbreadth challenges. I will conclude they should be able to. See infra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text. 
92. The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is also a matter of some
confusion. As a general matter, I think that probably too much has been made of the
distinction. Individuals present arguments against laws. Some arguments suggest total
invalidity and some suggest partial. This does not necessarily mark a difference in what the
challenger must show. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial
Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011).
93. The Court’s cases on nude dance are complicated. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529
U.S. 277 (2000) (splintering badly on the appropriate approach). For simplicity’s sake, assume
that nude dance may be prohibited.
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may have no rights of his own to assert, but neither is there a valid
rule that the government can claim to be enforcing. Imposing
sanctions—a fine or imprisonment—in such a situation is a depri-
vation of liberty or property without due process of law. 
To see how this argument relates to overbreadth and third-party
standing, start with the first puzzle. When the Court notes that the
restriction on third-party standing is prudential, can it really mean
to imply that if it chose to relax this restriction, the college student
would win a right to consume peyote based on the religious activi-
ties of Native Americans? That seems very unlikely. It is tanta-
mount to a suggestion that a single invalid application, if the court
considers it, requires the total invalidation of a statute—that is the
only way in which the invalidity as applied to the Native Americans
can remove the ban on the college student. That suggestion is
completely at odds with the doctrine of severability, which holds
that courts should generally invalidate only as much of a statute as
is necessary.94
So the Court cannot mean that any invalid application dooms a
statute. Instead, if the student were allowed to raise the rights of
Native Americans, the more likely consequence is that a court would
declare that their rights trump the statute: peyote use as religious
exercise gets an exemption. But this declaration would not help the
college student. He would still lose. That portion of the statute
governing his nonreligious conduct would remain in effect, so the
due process “valid rule” argument would not be available.
What that means is that deciding that the peyote ban could not
constitutionally be applied to Native American religious rituals
would have no effect on the outcome of the student’s challenge. It
would be advisory, which suggests that the ban on third-party
standing may have constitutional elements as well.95 At the least,
it derives from a fact about the merits: even if an individual were
allowed to argue that a statute would be unconstitutional as applied
to someone else, he would typically only get a statement of invalid-
ity in that other application. He would not prevail with respect to
94. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
95. The Supreme Court has suggested as much. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767
& n.20 (1982). Note 20 offers a lengthy quotation from United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
21 (1960), which does not explain exactly what the constitutional problem is.
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his own case, because there would still be a valid rule regulating his
conduct.
This conclusion raises another puzzle. There cannot be a blanket
constitutional ban on third-party standing, because the Supreme
Court has allowed it in some cases.96 And it cannot be the case that
third-party rights can never help, because some of the individuals
asserting the rights of other parties have prevailed.97 Setting First
Amendment overbreadth aside for the moment, the Court has
announced that third-party standing may be permitted when there
is an appropriate relationship between the individual and the third
party whose right he seeks to assert, and some reason why the third
party might be discouraged from raising the rights herself.98
What distinguishes such a case from the case of the hypothetical
college student is precisely that the individuals who prevail in the
Court’s third-party standing cases are helped by the other party’s
rights. The portion of the law invalidated by invoking the absent
party’s rights is the same portion that governs the party before the
court. The third party’s rights, as it were, clear a space for the
unprotected conduct: no valid rule remains to regulate it. 
One simple example is a doctor who wants to perform abortions
for her patients. She herself has no recognized constitutional right
to do so. But if she can invoke her patients’ rights to invalidate a
law that bans abortions, there will be no law left regulating the
conduct she seeks to engage in. Another example is a merchant who
wants to sell beer to males between eighteen and twenty-one years
old but is prevented by a state law that allows only females in that
age range to purchase it.99 Again, the merchant surely has no right
to sell beer to the males, but invoking their rights will invalidate the
portion of the law that purports to stop him.100
What this analysis suggests is that the traditional aversion to
third-party standing should be understood as having two compo-
nents. The first is what we could call the severability bar: ordi-
narily, the fact that a law might be unconstitutional as applied to
individual A, whose conduct is protected, will not prevent it from
96. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).
98. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 115-16.
99. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
100. See id.
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being applied to individual B, whose conduct is not. Ordinarily, that
is, there is no point in allowing third-party standing, because the
government will still win on the merits. And hence, ordinarily, there
might actually be constitutional problems with the practice because
any statements about the rights of the third party would be
advisory.
In some cases, however, the part of the statute knocked out by
invoking A’s rights will be the same part that applies to B, or A’s
rights will invalidate the statute in toto. This kind of case appears
to be what the Court has tried to identify by requiring a “relation-
ship” between the individual and the third party.101 In such cases,
the third-party rights do make a difference, so there is no concern
about advisory opinions or dictum. There is no severability bar.
What remains is what we could call the waiver and representation
bar: ordinarily, individuals are probably best positioned to argue for
their own rights. More significantly, they are also entitled to waive
those rights if they choose.102 The possibility of waiver is probably
what the Court has tried to identify by noting that constitutional
rights are “personal.”103 These practical concerns are also substan-
tial, but it is within the judicial power to relax them, and the Court
has done so on occasion, most typically when there is some reason
to think that individuals who do not wish to waive their rights will
nevertheless be discouraged from asserting them.104 
The analysis thus far explains why some people raising third
parties’ rights should win, and why others have no possibility of
winning and should not be heard in the first place. But now what
about the second problem? The nude dance club owner making an
overbreadth challenge to a statute that bans live entertainment is
not relying on rights that shield his conduct—his conduct is not
intertwined with the protected conduct. So he looks like the college
student, who should lose on the merits, and in fact should not be
heard to raise the rights that can be of no use to him. Yet not only
101. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 114-15. In Craig, 429 U.S. at 190 n.4, the Court described such
rights as “mutually interdependent,” which comes closer to the view I suggest here, although
it focused on the harmful effects on the absent parties rather than the question of whether
their rights could actually assist the litigant.
102. On the issue of standing and waiver of constitutional rights, see Eugene Kontorovich,
What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1693-1707 (2007).
103. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 123. 
104. See id. at 115-16.
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is he allowed to raise these rights, he prevails and even wins a more
comprehensive victory than the theater owner.
This cannot be third-party standing of the sort analyzed above.
Indeed, it is not. First Amendment overbreadth, as others have
noted, is best understood as a substantive First Amendment rule
that such laws cannot be enforced against anyone, regardless of
whether their speech is protected.105 Opinions may differ about the
nature and definition of this rule. Richard Fallon has described it as
“procedural or prophylactic.”106 I think it may be better described as
straightforward First Amendment balancing: a law that forbids a
substantial amount of protected speech is simply too hostile to
speech to justify its acceptable applications. The harm, chilling,
occasioned by a prohibition of sufficient protected speech outweighs
the benefits of proscribing the unprotected speech or conduct.107 The
law is inherently defective and entirely invalid.108
What this means is that First Amendment overbreadth is also an
example of the due process valid rule challenge. A party bringing an
overbreadth challenge is not asserting the rights of third parties on
the theory that those rights shield his conduct, which is what is
required for a successful third-party standing claim. The party is
asserting them on the theory that a substantial number of invalid
applications will doom the statute entirely, leaving no valid rule
regulating his conduct. Because the party is relying on a doctrine
that negates the entire statute, it is not surprising that he can win
a more complete victory than someone who argues only that partic-
ular conduct is protected. What is surprising, on this understanding
of overbreadth, is that the protected individual is not allowed to
mount an overbreadth challenge too.109 As master of his complaint,
105. See Monaghan, supra note 6; Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
HARV. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974).
106. See Fallon, supra note 80, at 868.
107. This seems to be the explanation the Court has suggested. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (describing balancing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98
(1940) (describing harms).
108. A similar calculus seems to underlie the more stringent First Amendment vagueness
doctrine: a law that will have a substantial chilling effect because its margins are uncertain
cannot be enforced against even unprotected conduct that clearly falls within its scope. See,
e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Thus, vagueness is also an example of a
valid rule due process challenge: an inherent defect dooms the statute, leaving no valid rule
in place, and individuals cannot be punished regardless of whether their conduct is protected.
109. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
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he should be able to do so, even if a court might find that holding his
particular conduct protected offers a narrower ground on which to
resolve the case.
So First Amendment overbreadth is not best understood as a
procedural device for asserting other parties’ rights. It is part of the
substantive law of the First Amendment. In fact, it is part of other
substantive law as well. In the federalism context, for instance, the
Court seems to have taken the position that if Congress aims at a
class of activity that is beyond its power—such as intrastate acts of
mere possession—its law is entirely invalid, without any inquiry
into whether particular applications might be permissible.110
Congress does not have the power to prohibit mere possession of a
gun near a school,111 for instance, but it does seem to have the power
to prohibit such possession of guns that have moved in interstate
commerce.112 Of course, almost all guns have moved in interstate
commerce. The gun possessed by Alfonso Lopez almost surely had,
but the Supreme Court did not inquire into that possibility before
striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act in its entirety.113 More
generally, any doctrinal test that includes a narrow tailoring re-
quirement arguably incorporates something like the overbreadth
doctrine.114
B. Bond v. United States
The upshot of the previous Section is that both overbreadth and
third-party standing are best conceptualized as presenting valid
rule due process challenges. There are, however, some differences.
In the third-party standing case, the challenging individual claims
that the rights of some party not before the court invalidate the law
110. This proposition is in some ways the contrapositive of Raich, which said that when
Congress aims at a class of activity that is within its power, the fact that isolated instances
may be intrastate and noncommercial will not exempt them. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
19-20 (2005).
111. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
112. After Lopez, Congress reenacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act with a “jurisdictional
hook” limiting its application to guns that “ha[ve] moved in or that otherwise affect[ ]
interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006)). This version has survived lower court
challenges. See, e.g., id.
113. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
114. See Monaghan, supra note 6.
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that purports to govern the individual who is before the court, either
in whole or in relevant part, so that no valid rule remains. If the
third party’s rights invalidate only the irrelevant parts of the law,
third party standing is denied, which makes sense given that the
individual in such a case would necessarily lose on the merits. In
the overbreadth case, the challenging individual claims that the law
is invalid in so many applications that it is entirely void. This rule
is familiar in the First Amendment context, where it is justified by
the danger of a chilling effect, but it actually operates in other con-
texts as well. 
Now we are ready to consider Bond v. United States, to ask how
it fits in the taxonomy sketched above, and whether it changes
anything.115 The facts are baroque. Having discovered that her best
friend and husband had an affair, leading to the friend’s pregnancy,
Carol Anne Bond sought revenge through a variety of schemes,
including attempts to expose the friend to toxic chemicals.116 This
conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 229, which forbids knowing possession
or use of toxic chemicals when not intended for a “peaceful pur-
pose.”117
Bond did not attempt to deny the conduct but argued instead that
the law was void because it was “beyond Congress’ constitutional
authority to enact.”118 This is easily recognizable as a valid rule due
process argument: Bond did not claim that her conduct was priv-
ileged in some way, but rather that the law under which she was
prosecuted was invalid for some other reason. In that sense, it was
just like the arguments that had prevailed in Lopez and Morrison.
But Bond was also different. Lopez and Morrison dealt with the
commerce power.119 Though the Court struggled over the years to
identify the limits to this power, it always maintained that such
limits existed, at least in theory.120 The Court, after a struggle, also
115. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
116. Id. at 2360.
117. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 229(a), 229F(1), (7), (8) (2006)).
118. Id.
119. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995).
120. Some Warren Court era cases suggest that the Court was willing to engage in only
very minimal judicial review of a congressional determination that a law fell within the
commerce power. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (“[W]here we
find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis
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affirmed that “states’ rights” were not a limit on the commerce
power.121 So the structure of the analysis in Lopez and Morrison was
clear: law-trumping rights were not at issue; the only question was
the boundaries of federal power. Lopez and Morrison were about the
banks of the stream, not about any islands within the stream.
Bond was different because the statute under which Carol Anne
Bond was prosecuted was not enacted pursuant to the commerce
power. Instead, it was passed to fulfill the United States’ obligations
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, a treaty ratified in 1997.122 
In contrast to the commerce power, where we know that there are
streambank limits but no states’ rights islands, the restrictions on
the treaty power are quite unclear. There might be streambank
limits; it might make sense to ask whether a treaty addresses an
issue on which there is a real need for international coordination, or
whether it is a pretextual device to expand federal regulatory
power.123 No one disputed that Bond could make a streambank
argument, just as Lopez and Morrison had. But there might also be
island limits—areas of state sovereignty that Congress cannot
override.124 Those would be states’ rights. The question Bond pre-
sented was whether an individual could assert those states’ rights,
assuming that they existed, in resisting a federal law.125
The Third Circuit answered no, relying on Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, in which the Supreme
for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.”). But a limit that is underenforced, or even unenforced, by the
judiciary is still a limit that a constitutionally scrupulous Congress is bound to observe. See
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 173-74 (2006).
121. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 554, 556 (1985).
Some limits on the commerce power do seem similar to states’ rights, notably the principles
that Congress cannot compel state executives to enforce federal laws or state legislatures to
enact laws. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (executives); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (legislatures). 
122. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.
123. For a more radical view, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005) (arguing that treaties cannot increase the legislative power of
Congress).
124. See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 403, 433-41 (2003). 
125. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.
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Court refused to allow a group of private power companies injured
by competition from the federally chartered Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) to argue that the TVA was unconstitutional.126
Toward the end of its opinion, the court commented that “there is no
objection to the Authority’s operations by the states, and, if this
were not so, the [utility companies], absent the states or their offi-
cers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the
[Tenth] [A]mendment.”127 This meant, the Third Circuit believed,
that in line with traditional third-party standing rules, an individ-
ual, absent the state, could not resist application of a federal law on
the ground that it violated states’ rights.128
The United States initially supported the Third Circuit’s decision
but modified its position at the Supreme Court level.129 While the
Third Circuit seemed to suggest that Bond could not make any
federalism-based arguments, the United States conceded that Bond
could challenge § 229 on the grounds that it exceeded Congress’s
power, a streambank argument, but maintained that she could not
raise states’ rights as a defense, an islands argument.130 Because
this appeared to be a more modest position than the one the Third
Circuit had taken, the Court appointed Stephen McAllister as an
amicus to defend the decision below.131 McAllister largely agreed
with the United States: of course an individual prosecuted under a
federal law could defend on the grounds that the statute exceeded
federal power.132 But he claimed the treaty power was unique133: it
had no streambank limits. Hence, the only argument available was
a states’ rights one, and traditional third-party standing rules
prevented individuals from raising those.134 Bond herself, unsur-
prisingly, argued that she should be allowed to raise any argument
against the statute.135
126. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 136-38 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939)).
127. Id. at 136 (alteration in original) (quoting Tenn. Elec., 306 U.S. at 144).
128. See id. at 137.
129. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361. 
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See Brief for the Amicus Curiae Appointed to Defend the Judgment Below at 27-47,
Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 09-01227), 2011 WL 118265, at *11-18.
133. Id. at 38-42.
134. Id. at 27-47.
135. See Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 09-1227), 2010 WL
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The Supreme Court sided with Bond.136 It rejected the govern-
ment’s proposed distinction between streambank and island limits.
“Federalism,” Justice Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court, “has
more than one dynamic.”137 In part, it protects “the integrity, dig-
nity, and residual sovereignty of the States” as “an end in itself.”138
But it also “protects the liberty of all persons within a State .... The
limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of
rights belonging only to the States.”139 Bond could raise whatever
Tenth Amendment arguments she chose, regardless of whether the
Amendment was construed as “a truism, or whether it has inde-
pendent force of its own.”140 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Breyer, wrote a brief concurrence to observe that of course a
criminal defendant could always argue that the law that purport-
edly regulated her conduct was unconstitutional.141
What does Bond mean for individuals hoping to raise Tenth
Amendment arguments against federal laws? Although, or perhaps
because, the opinion is unanimous, it does not offer a thick enough
theoretical account to make clear how its rule should apply in other
cases. Some early reactions have taken the decision to be very
important.142 In my view, however, Bond is best understood as
merely acknowledging the ability of criminal defendants to raise
valid rule due process challenges—not a surprising holding, and not
even one that is inconsistent with Tennessee Electric. Bond’s reach,
and its limits, can best be understood by considering several
categories of cases it might be thought to affect.
4973133, at *10-11.
136. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.
137. Id. at 2364.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2366-67 (citation omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
156 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 2367-68 (Ginsburg J., concurring).
142. See, e.g., Goldwater Inst., Groundbreaking US Supreme Court Decision on the Tenth
Amendment, ARIZONATEAPARTY.COM (June 17, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://arizonateaparty.
ning.com/profiles/blogs/goldwater-institute (“This decision is as radical in the direction of
liberty as the New Deal was radical in the direction of socialism.”).
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1. Regulated Individuals and Total or Partial and Relevant
Invalidity
Generally speaking, Bond can be described as holding that an
individual regulated by a statute can raise Tenth Amendment
arguments when the result, if successful, would be the invalidation
of the statute either entirely or to the extent that it governs him. As
Justice Ginsburg noted, this is not very surprising. The Court has
frequently entertained challenges from regulated individuals that
the statute governing their conduct is void, even if the reason for
voidness is not a right personal to them.143 This argument is a
standard valid rule due process claim. The only issue in such a case
is whether the right that allegedly voids the statute is so personal
to another that the rights holder is the only person who should be
heard. This is what I have described as the waiver and representa-
tion bar to third-party standing.
With respect to structural principles, the Court has been quite
willing to allow individuals to make the argument, as in INS v.
Chadha.144 In other cases, the Court has sometimes offered reasons
why sole reliance on the rights bearer is inappropriate. For instance,
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a distributor of contraceptives was allowed
to raise the rights of individuals wishing to use them because the
distributor was the only person subject to criminal sanctions.145 In
Singleton v. Wulff, a doctor was allowed to raise the rights of preg-
nant women who might have been hesitant to challenge an abortion
restriction because of the loss of privacy.146 In Craig v. Boren, how-
ever, the Court noted that regulated individuals have “uniformly”
been permitted to raise the rights of transactional counterparties,
suggesting that this sort of third-party standing is the rule rather
than the exception.147 In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, notably, the
143. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935-36 (1983) (concerning an individual facing
deportation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97 (1976) (concerning a beer seller); Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-18 (1976) (concerning doctors who performed abortions);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972) (concerning a distributor of contraceptives).
144. 462 U.S. at 935-36.
145. 405 U.S. at 446.
146. 428 U.S. at 117.
147. 429 U.S. at 195. Craig lists some other examples of individuals subject to coercion by
laws they claim are unconstitutional: white homeowners trying to avoid the constraint of
racially restrictive covenants, and contraceptive distributors. See id. at 193-97 (citing
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Supreme Court allowed a regulated company to raise Tenth
Amendment arguments in its challenge to the Social Security Act
without any indication that the issue of standing posed a problem
worth considering.148
Indeed, given that regulated individuals can raise valid rule due
process challenges, the argument that the rights that invalidate the
law do not “belong” to them is somewhat beside the point. The
regulated individuals are not trying to “assert” the rights in the
conventional sense but are rather relying on their existence to
support the claim that the regulating laws are invalid.149 The only
real concern from that perspective is waiver: if the individuals who
do possess the rights would like to waive them, it may be that the
laws are not invalid after all.150 Bond is perhaps best described as
recognizing that Tenth Amendment rights are not waivable and
that the waiver and representation bar to third-party standing will
always be lowered when such rights are at issue.
Bond thus makes clear that regulated individuals may rely on
states’ Tenth Amendment rights to argue that the law purporting
to govern their conduct is invalid. If, for instance, National League
of Cities v. Usery were still good law, and the federal government
could not set minimum wages for state employees, a janitor at the
state capitol would be able to invoke the state’s right to challenge a
federal law that prohibited him from working for less than the
minimum wage.151 Or, to use the example of a states’ right that
possibly still retains vitality, if the federal government ordered a
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443-46; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1963);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1953)). Again, an easy explanation for why these
people have standing is that, as regulated parties, they have valid rule due process
arguments. But see Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (holding that a physician lacked
standing to raise patients’ rights in challenging law that prohibited him from giving the
patients advice about contraceptives). Griswold v. Connecticut distinguishes Tileston on the
grounds that the doctor sought a declaratory judgment. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 481
(1965). Others have distinguished Tileston on the grounds that the doctor had not alleged
personal injury. Note, supra note 105, at 430.
148. 301 U.S. 548, 584-85 (1936).
149. By way of analogy, consider a suit under state law. One party might contend that a
relevant state statute has been preempted by federal law—in other words, that it is not an
enforceable rule. To make this claim, he need not show that he has any rights under the
federal law.
150. See Kontorovich, supra note 102, at 1700-01.
151. 426 U.S. 833, 836, 845-46, 851-52, 855 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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state to relocate its capital, and as part of that law ordered an
individual who had been conducting tours of the current capitol
building to cease, the tour guide could rely on the state’s right to
locate its capital as it saw fit.152
2. Regulated Individuals and Partial and Irrelevant Invalidity
Bond does not, however, say anything to indicate that what I
have called the severability bar to third-party standing should be
relaxed for Tenth Amendment claims. And indeed, it would make
very little sense to do so. Assume again that National League of
Cities remained good law, so that federal wage and hour regulations
could not be applied to state employment contracts. Should the
janitor at a private factory down the street be allowed to raise the
state’s Tenth Amendment rights in order to argue that he too should
be allowed to contract on whatever terms he chooses? Certainly not,
because knocking out the portion of the statute that governed state
employee contracts would not have any effect on the portion that
governed his contract. Regulated individuals who are not shielded
by the rights they seek to invoke should still not be allowed to raise
those rights.
3. State-Regulated Individuals and Commandeering Claims
One reason that Bond’s import is unclear is that we do not know
whether the Tenth Amendment actually contains any states’ rights
—whether it is merely a truism or whether it has independent
force.153 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Court seemed to give up on the idea of islands of state sover-
eignty untouchable by federal regulation.154 In its more recent
commandeering cases, however, the Court has articulated principles
that look a good deal like states’ rights.155 The Court has announced
152. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565-66, 574, 577 (1911). 
153. In fact, as suggested above, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text, these are
not the only alternatives. The Tenth Amendment is most naturally read not to affirm the
existence of state rights, but rather the persistence of state powers. The mere creation of the
federal government, it says, did not annihilate state powers that were neither given to the
federal government nor stripped from the states.
154. 469 U.S. at 546-47, 554, 556.
155. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (holding that the challenged law
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that the federal government can neither require states to enact
legislation nor require state officials to enforce federal laws.156 Can
private individuals argue that a federal law is unconstitutional
because it violates these Tenth Amendment limits?
Bond does not clearly answer this question. It does tell us that
the waiver and representation bar to third-party standing should
not stand in the way. But an individual seeking to raise a New York
v. United States or Printz v. United States claim may face other
problems: In the New York case, he will be challenging a valid state
law.157 In the Printz case, he will be resisting actions of state offi-
cials.158 In either case, the state action is permissible in the absence
of the federal mandate.
The fact that the state action is valid in the absence of the federal
law poses problems of causation and redressability, two-thirds of the
conventional standing triad.159 Without the federal mandate, the
state might still have enacted the state law or directed its officers
to enforce the federal one. And if the mandate is struck down,
neither state action is thereby invalidated.160 All the same, the
principle that states’ Tenth Amendment rights are not waivable
suggests that the individual should be able to make the argument.
He would not receive direct relief from the state regulation, but the
ability to then urge state decision makers to undo their decisions
might be tangible enough to meet the redressability demand.161
My main point here, however, is not to argue that individuals
should or should not be permitted to raise New York and Printz
claims. It is rather to point out that because Bond is about an
did not “require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens”).
156. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
157. 505 U.S. at 181.
158. 521 U.S. at 904.
159. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (identifying injury,
causation, redressability); id. at 562 (noting these are harder for unregulated individuals to
show). I have assumed that the state regulation constitutes sufficient injury.
160. At least, I would think not. A rule that any state action commanded by the federal
government is invalid, though the state had the power to take the action on its own initiative,
strikes me as odd. For one thing, it effectively allows the federal government to preempt state
laws by demanding them. 
161. See generally Ara B. Gershengorn, Private Party Standing to Raise Tenth Amendment
Commandeering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1065 (2000) (arguing that individuals should
have standing to make Printz and New York arguments).
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individual regulated directly by the federal government, who can
raise a valid rule due process challenge, it does not necessarily
resolve the question of New York/Printz standing. All it does for
those claims is remove the waiver and representation bar.
4. Unregulated Individuals 
New York and Printz claims are difficult because the individual
seeking to raise the state’s Tenth Amendment rights is not directly
regulated by the federal law he wants to challenge. He is, however,
at least subject to some legal regulation that the federal law com-
mands. Totally unregulated individuals are in a different situation.
Imagine, for instance, that the federal government ordered a state
to move its capital and the state acquiesced. The law imposes no
obligations on private parties. Should the private tour guide for the
state capitol, whose receipts will decline, be allowed to raise the
state’s Tenth Amendment rights to challenge this federal law?
The outcome here is even harder to judge than it was for the New
York/Printz claims. Now, in addition to causation and redressability
issues, we have an injury question too. Is the decline in receipts a
sufficient injury? Helvering v. Davis suggests that the answer may
be yes.162 There, a corporate shareholder was allowed to raise Tenth
Amendment arguments in challenging the Social Security Act, pur-
suant to which the corporation was deducting money from employ-
ees’ pay.163 The shareholder’s theory was that the corporation, and
hence the shareholder, would suffer economic injury thereby, though
he was clearly not the subject of regulation.164
On the other hand, it is clear that individuals face a higher
barrier in seeking to challenge a law that does not purport to govern
their conduct. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, for instance, the Court seemed
to assume that the single individuals who wanted to obtain con-
traceptives had little opportunity to challenge the law banning their
distribution because they were not subject to prosecution.165 That,
after all, was one reason it granted standing to the distributor. More
162. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
163. Id. at 637-40.
164. Id.
165. 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (noting that single individuals not subject to prosecution were
“to that extent, ... denied a forum in which to assert their own rights”).
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recently, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court noted that
what a plaintiff must show to establish standing “depends consider-
ably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action ...
at issue.”166 “When ... a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the
government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation)
of someone else,” the Court continued, “much more is needed.”167 
The difference between a regulated and an unregulated individ-
ual, in Lujan’s terms, is that it is harder for the unregulated indi-
vidual to show injury, causation, and redressability.168 A different
phrasing, in the terms of this Article, is that a regulated individual
can mount a valid rule due process challenge, while an unregulated
individual cannot. Bond deals with regulated individuals. It does
not necessarily mean much for unregulated individuals. 
In sum, the easiest way to understand Bond is as recognizing that
regulated individuals can raise valid rule due process challenges.
Such individuals are not asserting third-party rights in the sense
that they rely on those rights to generate their claims. Their claims
arise from their own rights under the Due Process Clause. The role
that third-party rights play is the more incidental one of invalidat-
ing the rule that purports to govern the individual. The main con-
cern in such a case is that the third parties to whom these rights
belong might wish to waive them, with the result that the rule
would be valid after all. Bond holds that Tenth Amendment rights
are not waivable in this sense—not much of an innovation, because
New York explicitly held exactly the same thing nineteen years
earlier.169
166. 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
167. Id. at 562. In particular, one might question whether a company facing greater
competition has suffered the injury to “a legally protected interest” that Lujan requires. Id.
at 560. Standing doctrine is obviously complex and theoretically unsettled. For a review and
analysis from a perspective relevant to this Article, see Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the
Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131 (2009).
168. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
169. See 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’
of state officials.”).
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CONCLUSION
Valid rule due process challenges are more common than we
think. They are not always explicitly articulated, but recognizing
that an individual’s basic complaint is government compulsion
without legal authorization allows us to identify such challenges.
There are several benefits to doing so.
In the case of Lochner-era substantive due process, understanding
the structure of the argument lets us understand this body of law as
its contemporaries did, rather than shoehorning the decisions into
modern conceptual categories. Reading the cases as about stream-
bank limits on state power rather than law-trumping fundamental
rights gives us a deeper understanding of the decisions and also of
their relation to modern doctrine.
Lochner’s heirs—if by that term we mean more recent decisions
that also use this form of argument170—are not the usual suspects.171
Instead, the valid rule due process argument turns out to be the
constitutional basis for Erie, modern federalism decisions, and
overbreadth and vagueness arguments. 
Identifying the constitutional principle that restrains the gov-
ernment in such cases has some value in its own right. Erie’s
constitutional source, for instance, has long been an object of spec-
ulation. It also contributes to a more mature understanding of
Lochner and its pathologies. There is nothing wrong with the form
of a valid rule due process argument; the question in each case will
be whether courts have identified a sensible limit on legislative
power that is appropriate for judicial enforcement. Lochner’s limits
might at one point have made sense, but they lost fit as circum-
stances changed.172
170. In a well-known article, Cass Sunstein looks for decisions that use a contested
baseline, which is a different path to follow. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
171. One common argument is that Lochner-style due process is the intellectual ancestor
of Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 224-29 (1990); John
Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 943-45
(1973). However, Roe relies on a law-trumping right and is conceptually very different. 410
U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
172. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process,
8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 988-91 (2006).
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Last, understanding the form of argument behind federalism and
overbreadth decisions can offer courts guidance going forward.173
The analysis performed here shows the conceptual structure of
overbreadth and third-party standing, which helps to clarify the
relationship between them. Understanding their structures and
relationships, in turn, lets us see the implications of Bond, which
are less sweeping than might be supposed. In sum, noting the
common structure of arguments in different topics and eras gives us
a deeper understanding of constitutional doctrine in the past, the
present, and the future.
173. I have mentioned several areas in which I believe due process valid rule arguments
operate, but there are others. The case of individuals seeking to resist state laws on the
grounds of federal preemption, for instance, has caused courts some difficulties. If the state
seeks to enforce the law against the individual, his ability to present the preemption
argument as a defense is uncontroversial. But if the individual seeks preenforcement
injunctive relief, standing problems may arise. If the allegedly preemptive federal statute does
not grant the individual a cause of action, what right is he asserting? Some federal courts
have reasoned that the Supremacy Clause supplies the necessary individual right. See, e.g.,
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2009)
(permitting suit for injunctive relief “directly under the Supremacy Clause”), vacated sub nom.
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). But it seems odd to read
the Supremacy Clause as a source of individual rights, and other courts have questioned
whether a preemption claim can go forward in the absence of an individual right under the
allegedly preemptive federal statute. See, e.g., TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618,
622 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000). In Douglas, the Court avoided the issue, though four Justices
expressed the view that, at the least, the Supremacy Clause did not always supply a cause of
action. See 132 S. Ct. at 1211-13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). It might, however, prove fruitful
to ask whether the relationship between the individual and the challenged state law is such
that the individual can assert a valid rule due process challenge, in which case the Due
Process Clause would supply the necessary individual right.
